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ABSTRACT: We work with a panel of bilateral trade ﬂows from 1988 to 2002,
exploring the inﬂuence of infrastructure, institutional quality, colonial and geo-
graphic context, and trade preferences on the pattern of bilateral trade. We are
interested in threshold eﬀects, and so emphasize those cases where bilateral coun-
try pairs do not actually trade. We depart from the institutions and infrastructure
literature in this respect, using Heckman selection model-based gravity estimators
of trade ﬂows. We also depart from this literature by mixing principal components
(to condense our institutional and infrastructure measures) with a focus on devia-
tions from expected values for given income cohorts to control for multicollinearity.
Infrastructure, and institutional quality, are signiﬁcant determinants not only of
export levels, but also of the likelihood exports will take place at all. Our results
support the notion that export performance, and the propensity to take part in the
trading system at all, depends on institutional quality and access to well developed
transport and communications infrastructure. Indeed, this dependence is far more
important, empirically, than variations in tariﬀs in explaining sample variations
in North-South trade. This implies that policy emphasis on developing country
market access, instead of support for trade facilitation, may be misplaced.
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If trade matters, what can we then say about the countries that do not trade?
Many countries in Africa, for example, are consistent underperformers. While
”globalizers,” as deﬁned by Dollar and Kraay (2004), appear to be catching up
with the OECD, the countries that are not are falling further behind, in both
trade and growth terms. This begs the obvious question ”why?” Why do they
not trade, or why do they trade less relative to the recent set of globalizers? The
issues involved are important ones. To address them, negotiators within the World
Trade Organization have been given a ”leave no country behind” mandate focused
on integration of developing countries into the trading system. Emphasis has been
placed on North-South tariﬀs, and there has been a massive mobilization of in-
stitutional resources (political, ﬁscal, legal and research-based) focused on trade
promotion through liberalization of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers. The underly-
ing magnitudes are highly relevant, as the mobilization of resources focused on
trade policy, in a world of limited institutional resources, implies shifting away
resources from other possible priority issues, like institutional development and
improvements to basic infrastructure.
The renewed emphasis on growth through trade follows a tumultuous period of
shifting perceptions on the role of trade in the empirical literature. Outward
oriented policies emerged as a consensus growth prescription in the 1980s. This
consensus was backed by cross-country studies of openness and growth. A pioneer-
ing attempt to classify trade regimes was conducted in an NBER study directed
by Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger (1978). The common message carried from this
work was that the degree of openness of the trade regime was positively corre-lated with export growth, which was in turn positively correlated with real GDP
growth. A second large-scale attempt to classify countries by trade orientation was
conducted by the World Bank (1987), reaching the same broad conclusion. What
followed was a ﬂood of cross-country empirical research linking trade to growth,
and broadly supporting the paradigm view.
The consensus view was challenged in important papers by Edwards (1993) and
Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999). The criticisms went to the foundations of the prior
body of research, and were directed at the conclusions one can safely draw from
cross-country studies. Rodriguez and Rodrik argued that we should not be com-
forted, but rather worried, by the apparent ability of highly disparate measures to
capture the ”same” relationship between openness and growth. Edwards argued
that the basic approach to cross-country studies abstracted away from important
factors better identiﬁed through studies of historical episodes. On the basis of
such longer-term historical experience, both the Edwards and Rodriguez and Ro-
drik papers concluded that the role of trade had been overblown. However, the
result has not been a paradigm shift, but rather more careful econometrics. As
the dust settles, trade remains standing as a focus of attention.
The more recent body of work on export performance and economic growth has
internalized earlier criticisms, and emphasis is now on the role of institutions and
the record of experience within individual countries. Dollar and Kraay (2002) ﬁnd
that institutional quality is highly correlated with trade itself. They therefore
focus on decadal changes in growth instrumented on changes in trade and insti-
tutions, and interpret their results as meaning that institutions and trade both
matter in the long-run, while trade growth oﬀers short-term advantages over insti-
2tutional improvements for fostering growth. In another paper, Dollar and Kraay
(2004) examine episodes of liberalization, concluding that for individual countries
that underwent recent trade liberalization episodes, expansion of trade translates
into rising incomes and falling poverty rates. Wacziarg and Welch (2003) also
focus on liberalization episodes, and also conclude that trade growth is linked
robustly to growth and investment. Greenaway et al (2002) address a diﬀerent
criticism of Edwards and Rodriguez and Rodrik, linked to fundamental problems
with the openness indicators used in the cross-country literature. They work with
a dynamic panel and three openness indicators, ﬁnding that the trade openness
relationship is robust to the earlier criticisms. Finally, while Rodrik et al (2004)
do not ﬁnd a direct impact of trade on incomes, they do ﬁnd a more complex rela-
tionship between institutions, integration, and growth. Institutions can promote
integration, while integration also has a (positive) impact on institutional quality.
As they ﬁnd institutions important for incomes, this suggests that trade can have
an indirect eﬀect on incomes. The consensus emerging is that trade does matter,
but that it is linked to the context in which it is placed. Institutions matter, as
does infrastructure. Hence, the development agencies have focused on facilitation
aspects of development assistance, and emphasis is again being placed on institu-
tion building. At the World Bank, for example, Freund and Bolaky (2004) stress
the importance of labor and business regulation in the trade-growth mechanism,
while Chang et al (2005) oﬀer panel evidence that the broad domestic mix of
policy, institutions, and infrastructure plays an important role in moderating the
impact of trade.
In part, the pattern of export performance is linked to the political economy of pol-
icy reform, institutional development and colonial history, development assistance,
3and the general North-South dialog. We can develop analytical models linking all
these factors. At a more basic level though, there is also a need to quantify the
relative magnitudes involved in the interaction between trade, infrastructure, and
institutions. This is the issue explored here.
We do have evidence that improvements in transportation services and infras-
tructure can lead to improvements in export performance. Lim˜ ao and Venables
(2001) show that infrastructure is quantitatively important in determining trans-
port costs. They estimate that poor infrastructure accounts for 40 percent of
predicted transport costs for coastal countries and up to 60 percent for landlocked
countries. Bougheas et al (1999) have analyzed the eﬀects of infrastructure on
trade through its inﬂuence on transport costs. Extending the DSF Ricardian trade
model by endogenising transport costs and infrastructure formation their ﬁndings
predict that for pairs of countries for which it is optimal to invest in infrastructure,
a positive relationship between the level of infrastructure and the volume of trade
takes place. Using a gravity model the authors provide evidence from European
countries which supports the theoretical ﬁndings. Wilson et al (2004) have quanti-
ﬁed the eﬀects of trade facilitation by considering four aspects of trade facilitation
eﬀort: ports, customs, regulations, and e-business (which is a proxy for the service
sectors of telecommunications and ﬁnancial intermediation, which are key for all
types of trade). The authors ﬁnd that the scope and beneﬁt of unilateral trade
facilitation reforms are very large and that the gains fall disproportionately on
exports.
Levchenko (2004) suggests that diﬀerences in institutional quality can themselves
be a source of comparative advantage, ﬁnding that institutional diﬀerences across
4countries are important determinants of trade patterns. Using a gravity model,
Anderson and Marcoullier (2002) ﬁnd that bilateral trade volumes are positively
inﬂuenced by the trading countries’ institutional quality. Ranjay and Lee (2003)
look at a particular aspect of institutions- enforcement of contracts-and its impact
on the volume of international trade. The authors construct a theoretical model
to show how imperfect enforcement of contracts can reduce the volume of trade
in goods for which quality issues are important. Using a gravity equation the
paper incorporates proxies for the enforcement of contracts and ﬁnds that the
measures of contract enforcement aﬀect the volume of trade in both diﬀerentiated
and homogeneous goods, but the impact is larger for diﬀerentiated goods. Also
employing a gravity equation, Depken and Sonora (2005) estimate the eﬀects of
economic freedom on U.S. consumer exports and imports for the years 1999 and
2000. They ﬁnd that better institutional quality of the partner country has a
positive eﬀect on the amount of exports from the U.S. to that country.
In this paper we examine the inﬂuence of infrastructure, institutional quality,
colonial and geographic context, and trade preferences on the pattern of bilateral
trade. We are interested in threshold eﬀects, and so emphasize those cases where
bilateral country pairs do not actually trade. We depart from the institutions and
infrastructure literature in this respect, using selection-based gravity modeling of
trade ﬂows. We also depart from this literature by mixing principal components (to
condense our institutional and infrastructure measures) with a focus on deviations
in the resulting indexes from expected values for given income cohorts to control
for multicollinearity.1 Here, we work with a panel of 284,049 bilateral trade ﬂows
1Recent related work involving thresholds, zeros in bilateral trade, and trade growth along
extensive and intensive margins in a gravity context, includes Hummels and Klenow (2005),
Evenett and Venables (2003), and Felbermayr and Kohler (2004).
5from 1988 to 2002. Matching bilateral trade and tariﬀ data and controlling for
tariﬀ preferences, level of development, and standard distance measures, we ﬁnd
that infrastructure, and institutional quality, are signiﬁcant determinants not only
of export levels, but also of the likelihood exports will take place at all. Landlocked
countries also do consistently worse. Our results support the notion that export
performance, and the propensity to take part in the trading system at all, depends
on institutional quality and access to well developed transport and communications
infrastructure. Indeed, this dependence is far more important, empirically, than
variations in tariﬀs in explaining sample variations in North-South trade.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss our dataset and the
basic estimating framework. Results are discussed in Section 3, and conclusions
oﬀered in Section 4.
2 Methodology
When examining the global pattern of bilateral trade ﬂows, one striking feature
of the landscape is that many country pairs do not trade. In our sample 42% of
importer-exporter pairings had zero bilateral trade. Thus, apart from analyzing
the eﬀects of diﬀerent factors on worldwide trade, we also concentrate our attention
on factors that may explain why trade does not occur at all. While some factors
might be expected to be important in the decision on how much to import, the
same factors may be diﬀerentially important when the trader decides whether he
or she will import at all. And yet, these two decisions clearly are linked. Only if
the trader decides to import can trade volumes be observed and hence examined.
6Analyzing the determinants of trade ﬂows without taking into account potential
trade which does not take place between country pairs may bias results. At a
minimum, unobserved trade may contain information about the factors driving
bilateral trade relationships.
In this section we spell-out our estimation strategy. This involves specifying a
sample selection model. Employing a sample selection model allows us to take
account of the censoring process that leads to zero or missing bilateral trade ﬂows.
More precisely, in our estimating framework the outcome variable (the dependent
variable in the second stage equation) is only observed if the deﬁned selection
criterion is met. In our case, the amount of the trade can only be observed if
trade occurs. We therefore employ a sample selection estimation, combining the
analysis of the probability of trade ﬂows with the analysis of trade volumes. (Simi-
larly, Felbermayr and Kohler (2004) employ a Tobit estimator to examine bilateral
zeros.)
2.1 Data
We work with a panel of bilateral trade, trade policy, geographic characteristics,
and income data spanning from 1988 to 2002. Our trade and tariﬀ data were
obtained from the UN/World Bank WITS system (World Integrated Trade Solu-
tion). The data in WITS come, primarily, from the UNCTAD TRAINS and COM-
TRADE systems and the World Trade Organization’s integrated tariﬀ database
(IDB). The countries included in the sample are listed in the annex.2 There are
2While trade data are available for a wide range of country pairs, the available tariﬀ data are
more limited. For this reason, we utilize a standard WITS procedure of matching the nearest
adjacent year to represent otherwise missing tariﬀ data. Interpolation is then used for wider
7several country combinations for which trade is not reported. Following the recent
literature, we assume that these missing observations from the database represent
zero trade. (See Coe et al 2002, Felbermayr and Kohler 2004, Santos and Tenreyro
2005.) We use import data as it is likely to be more reliable than export data since
imports constitute a tax base and governments have an incentive to track import
data. Whenever import data was missing we used mirrored export data if it was
available (this represented only half percent of the observations). Trade data is
deﬂated using the reporter country’s GDP deﬂator. Income and population are
taken from the World Development Indicators database. Geographic data, to-
gether with dummies for same language and colonial links, are taken from Clair
et al (2004).3 The distance data are calculated following the great circle formula,
which uses latitudes and longitudes of the relevant capital cities.
We are ultimately interested in the dual role of institutions and infrastructure. Our
data include indexes produced by the World Bank on infrastructure, and by the
Fraser Institute for institutions. The institution indexes are from the ”Economic
Freedom of the World” (EFW) database.4 The EFW indexes are supplemented
with robustness checks (with shorter panels) using data from Transparency In-
ternational and Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). The EFW indexes are
themselves based on several sub-indexes designed to measure the degree of ’eco-
nomic freedom’ in ﬁve areas: (1) size of government: expenditures, taxes, and
enterprises; (2) legal structure and protection of property rights; (3) access to
sound money: inﬂation rate, possibility to own foreign currency bank accounts;
gaps. A further complication is when tariﬀ data are never reported for a country pair. In order
to obtain an approximate tariﬀ value applicable between these country pairs we then utilize the
average applied tariﬀ for the reporting countries for a given year.
3http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
4http://www.freetheworld.com/download.html#efw
8(4) freedom to trade internationally: taxes on international trade, regulatory trade
barriers, capital marke controls, diﬀerence between oﬃcial exchange rate and black
market rate, etc.; and (5) regulation of credit, labor, and business. Each index
ranges from 0 to 10 reﬂecting the distribution of the underlying data. Notionally,
a low value is bad, and a higher value is good. We work with indexes for 1985,
1990, 1995, 2000, 2001 and 2002, with in interpolated values for years without
values.
To measure infrastructure, we have taken data from the World Development In-
dicators database. This includes data on the percentage of paved roads out of
total roads, on the number of ﬁxed and mobile telephone subscribers (per 1,000
people), on the number of telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people), on telephone
mainlines in largest city (per 1,000 people), telephone mainlines per employee,
mobile phones (per 1,000 people), and freight of air transport (million tons per
km). Interpolation is used for years where no data are available.
Since both sets of indexes are highly correlated, we have used principal component
analysis to produce a set of summary indexes. The results are reported in Table
1. Ideally, principal component analysis identiﬁes patterns in data and based on
these patterns it reduces the number of dimensions of the data without a lot of
loss of information. From the results in Table 1, we take the ﬁrst two components
to produce four indexes; two institutional indexes, and two infrastructure indexes.
These reﬂect between 70 percent and 77 percent of variation in the sample. From
the weighting factors in the table, we interpret the ﬁrst infrastructure index as
measuring communications, and the second the physical transport system. We
interpret the ﬁrst institutional index as measuring general correspondence with the
9market-oriented legal and institutional orientation ﬂagged by the Fraser indexes (in
a sense the correspondence to the Anglo-U.S. socioeconomic model). The second
institutional index then measures less interventionist systems with lower taxes and
more market friendly regulations (deviations toward the Anglo-US social model).
2.2 Estimating Equations
We work with Heckman’s selection model (Heckman 1979, Greene 2003), where
we estimate the probability of trade occuring jointly with the determinans of the
level of trade using maximum likelihood methods. This is based on the following
two latent variable sub-models:
M1 = α
0X + u1 (1)
M2 = β
0Z + u2 (2)
where X is a k-vector of regressors, Z is an m-vector of regressors, and u1 and
u2 are the error terms which are jointly normally distributed, independently of X
and Z, with zero expectations. The variable M1 is only observed if M2 > 0. The
variable M2 takes the value of one if M1 is observed, while it is 0 if the variable
M1 is zero or missing. In our regressions M1 is the value of imports, while M2 is
a dummy variable taking the value one if trade occurs while zero otherwise. The
ﬁrst equation shows how the value of imports is aﬀected by diﬀerent factors, while
the second gives some insight into why trade occurs at all between two partner
countries.
In specifying the underlying structure of equation (1), or identically the right
10hand side variables that make up X, we follow the gravity-model based literature.
There are many paths that lead to the now standard functional relationship we
use here, inclusive of importer and exporter ﬁxed eﬀects and economic distance
terms. (See Evenett and Keller 2002; Anderson 1979; Anderson and Marcoullier
2002, Anderson and van Wincoop 2003; and Deardorﬀ 1988.) Such an estimating
framework can, for example, be interpreted as a reﬂection of ﬁrst order conditions
given an equilibrium dataset for goods trade. Interpreted this way, the gravity
equation maps relative variations in bilateral trade ﬂows to the determinants of
relative variations in price for bilateral country pairs. Price determinants in the
empirical literature include bilateral variables like tariﬀs, geographic distance, as
well as country-speciﬁc factors for both importer and exporter. To highlight the
basic properties inherent in such a speciﬁcation of trade ﬂows in a relatively par-
simonious manner, and so to arrive at our estimating equation, we will start from
trade based on CES preferences. At a macro-economic level, models of bilateral
trade based on CES preferences, like the Obstfeld-Rogoﬀ model, lead immedi-
ately to the gravity relationship (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ 1995). So do CES-based
multi-sector models based on either ﬁrm or national product diﬀerentiation (Her-
tel 1997). In formal terms, we start with CES preferences for imports deﬁned over









1 > φ > 0 (3)
It follows immediately from ﬁrst order conditions for a constrained optimization








11where σ = 1/(1−φ). Similarly, under ﬁrm level diﬀerentiation (as in the Obstfeld-
Rogoﬀ implementation of Ethier-type production) and standard large-group and
symmetry assumptions (Francois and Roland-Holst 1997), with nr ﬁrms located in
each of r regions and import demand speciﬁed over ﬁrm-based varieties, the CES































In equation (5), the term γ reﬂects a combination of CES weights and number of
ﬁrms, aggregated by country, while ¯ xi is the average quantity consumed from each
ﬁrm in a region. The number will be ﬁxed or given in a particular cross-section,
as we are then working with an actual (particular) market outcome. Comparison
of equations (3) and (5) should make it clear that in both cases we can work with
equation (4). Starting with equation (4), if we take logs we have the following
representation of import demand:
lnMi = lnQ + σ lnαi − σ lnPi + (σ − 1)lnP. (6)
Deﬁning the fob price from country i as P ∗




i (1 + τ)G. (7)
In equation (7), the term τ represents trade taxes, while the term G represents fac-
tors linked to the cost of trade, such as administrative burdens, and also transport
and communications costs linked to physical infrastructure and physical distance.
12We can make a substitution of equation (7) into equation (6) to get a variation of
the now standard5 representation of the basic gravity equation with exporter and
importer dummy variables:
lnMi,j = lnQj + σ lnαi,j − σ lnP
∗
i − σ ln(1 + τi,j) − σ lnGi,j (8)
= Dj + Di − σ ln(1 + τi,j) − σ lnGi,j.
In arriving at the ﬁnal version of equation (8) we have introduced indexing by
source and destination, while also imposing similar preferences (i.e. similar CES
weights) across importers with respect to exporters. Importer and exporter eﬀects
(our dummy variables Di and Dj) sweep up a range of country speciﬁc eﬀects, like
fob price, the linkage between income level and total demand Q, and the linkage
in ﬁrm level diﬀerentiation models between size of total output in a country and
the number of ﬁrms included in the term γ. Note that when we interpret the
gravity model as following from ﬁrst-order conditions, we can hold these various
country-speciﬁc eﬀects as ﬁxed, as we are working with data reﬂecting a particular
set of actual market outcomes. This lets us focus on the determinants of bilateral
variations in import demand. For this reason, an extremely reduced form gravity
model can be useful for estimating trade-cost related eﬀects linked to variables
like distance, customs union membership, and bilateral tariﬀ rates. When we
replace the summary exporter and importer dummies (as we will do here) by
explicit measures of country speciﬁc variables like GDP, country size, governance,
infrastructure and the like, we are then also able to quantify their impact on trade
5The Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) speciﬁcation calls for a mix of bilateral resistance
terms in a non-linear estimating equation. However, Feenstra (2004) shows that including
country-speciﬁc eﬀects generates the same results as the Anderson and van Wincoop results
with little loss of eﬃciency. Given our focus in the estimation on exporter-speciﬁc measures, we
follow Feenstra, with modiﬁcations to allow for exporter variables as discussed in the text.
13ﬂows as well.
Equation (8) is relatively general, and is used in much of the current literature.
This includes Mtys (1997) and Francois and Woerz (2006). For our purposes
though, we cannot use both ﬁxed importer and exporter eﬀects in our panel re-
gressions. This is because we want to work with time-varying country-speciﬁc
variables related to institutions and infrastructure, which precludes the use of
time-varying country dummies. Instead, we include time speciﬁc and reporter
(importer) country speciﬁc dummies. This forces us to include variables that are
likely to be important determinants of the reduced-form exporter eﬀects dummies
in equation (8). From the gravity literature, we expect trade ﬂows to be a function
of importer and exporter size and income, as well as of determinants of bilateral
trade costs like distance and tariﬀs. We also include variables of interest for the
present exercise. These are measures of infrastructure and institutional aspects of
importers and exporters that we expect to impact on trading costs. In terms of
our sample selection model we specify the following:
lnMi,j,t = α0 + α1 lnp pcGDPj,t + α2 lnr pcGDPi,t + α3 lnp POPj,t (9)
+α4 lnr POPi,t + α5Ti,j,t + α6 lndisti,j + α7landlockedi
α8comlang ethnoi,j + α9colonyi,j
+α10 lnINF1j,t + α11 lnINS1j,t + α12 lnINF2j,t
+α13 lnINS2j,t + u1
14and for the selection estimation we assume that Mi,j,t is observed when we have
β0 + β1 lnp pcGDPj,t + β2 lnr pcGDPi,t + β3 lnp POPj,t (10)
+β4 lnr POPi,t + β5 lndisti,j + β6landlockedi
+β7comlang ethnoi,j + β8colonyi,j + β9 lnINF1j,t
+β10 lnINS1j,t + β11 lnINF2j,t + β12 lnINS2j,t + u1 > 0
In equations (9) and (10), u1 and u2 have correlation ρ.6 Equation (9) assesses
the determinants of the bilateral trade and shows the main factors inﬂuencing the
amount of trade, given trade occurred between the two trading partners. Equation
(10) sets out the selection criteria and provides information on the factors that
determine whether or not we observe trade between country pairs.
All of our right-hand side variables are summarized in Table 2. Mi,j,t is country
i imports from country j at time t. As a proxy for market potential, POP is
included for partner (exporter) and reporter countries, as well as per-capita in-
come pcGDP. These are standard gravity variables, as is distance dist and tariﬀs
T. For bilateral import protection, we use applied tariﬀs, lnTi,j,t = ln(1 + τi,j,t).
τi,j,t indicates the applied tariﬀ rate oﬀered by importer i to exporter j in period
t. As reporter speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects (non time-varying) are included in the regres-
sions and these are highly correlated with the tariﬀ data we regressed the log of
the tariﬀs on the reporter dummies and retained the residuals. These residuals
are used for the regressions and provide a measure of the eﬀects of bilateral tar-
iﬀs given other reporter speciﬁc characteristics. Distance is well established in
6Note that while included in the levels model, ln(T) is not included in the selection model.
This choice is based on speciﬁcation tests (it is never signiﬁcant in our selection models), as
reﬂected in our estimation for Table 6.
15the gravity equation literature. (See for example Disidier and Head 2003, and
Anderson and van Wincoop 2003.) The dummy landlocked takes the value of
one if the importing country is landlocked and zero otherwise. Landlocked coun-
tries are expected to have higher transportation costs than countries with similar
characteristics not being landlocked. Lim˜ ao and Venables (2001) estimate that a
representative landlocked country has transport costs approximately 50% greater
than does a representative coastal economy.
To capture historical and cultural linkages between trading partners several zero-
one type dummy variables are included in the estimating equation. The variable
colony takes the value of 1 if the exporting country j was a colony of the partner
country i. Finally, a separate dummy, comlang ethno captures if the traders of the
two partner countries can speak the same language, or generally share the same
linguistic heritage.
Since both the factors proxying institutional quality of the partner country and
the factors measuring the availability of infrastructure are highly correlated with
income per capita and population, we regress our indexes against per-capita income
and population and take the residuals as representative of deviations from income-
conditional expected values for each of the four indexes.
lnINDEXk,j,t = αk,0 + αk,1 lnpcGDPj,t + αk,2 (lnPOPj,t) (11)
+ej,t,k = 1..4
These deviations ej,t then correspond to the index values in equations (9) and (10).
OLS estimates of equation (11) are reported in Table 3. Both the ﬁrst infrastruc-
ture variable, mapping to communications infrastructure, and the second variable
16capturing physical transportation are highly correlated with income. Roughly half
of the variation in the institutional variables can be represented by income levels.
3 Results
Estimation results for variables of interest for the full sample and for sample splits
are reported in Table 4. In Table 4 we report marginal eﬀects from ML-based
Heckman selection model regressions. Separate OLS estimates for equation (9) are
reported in Table 5 and tobit estimates are reported in Table 6. Focusing on the
simultaneous ML-based estimates in Table 4, for the full sample communications
infrastructure (INF1) is signiﬁcant with the expected sign. This holds both for
the ﬁrst equation (probability of trading or not) and for the second equation (the
value of trade given that trade does occur). Again, there is a broad correspondence
with priors. Transport infrastructure matters, and signiﬁcantly, both for trade
volumes, but also for the probability that trade occurs at all. The quality of
general governance has a positive eﬀect on both trade and the probability that
trade occurs. Moreover, countries with lower degrees of government intervention
in the economy have higher exports than otherwise. Again, this is not surprising.
We will focus shortly on the economic magnitudes of these eﬀects. They are
actually quite large.
In the remaining columns of the table, we turn to various splits on our full sam-
ple. What we are looking for is evidence of a diﬀerential role, at the margin,
for institutions and infrastructure depending on the level of development. The
second column of Table 4 focuses on South exports to the North, the third on
17LDC exports to the North, and the last on South-South trade. The exporters
in the last three sets of results are therefore restricted to low and lower middle
income countries according to World Bank deﬁnitions, and hence exclude high
income countries. The importers exclude low and lower middle income countries
in the second and third sets of results, high income in the fourth. For developing
countries overall, the message is again that infrastructure matters. This applies
not only to physical transportation, but also to communications infrastructure.7
General governance has a positive eﬀect on trade, and a smaller presence by the
state in the economy of the exporter does increase exports somewhat. However,
the governance result changes somewhat for the poorest countries. We will explore
this point further when we develop interaction terms. An important point to make
at this juncture though is that relative to the average level for its income cohort,
increased regulation and size of government improved performance for the least
developed countries. This points to an undersupply of government services at the
lowest income levels in the sample. This is further manifested when we turn to
the South-South sample split, where we ﬁnd that the involvement of the state in
the economy has an ambiguous impact on trade. While it positively inﬂuences
the probability of trading, it has a negative eﬀect on the value of exports. We
again get an unambiguous message about infrastructure though. It is a signiﬁcant
determinant of trade both for the probit results, and also for the trade volumes
given that trade occurs.
If we move from statistical signiﬁcance to economic relevance, what do our coef-
ﬁcient estimates tell us? We address this question in Table 7. The table reports
7This conﬁrms the pioneering results of Boatman (1992). Boatman found that not only general
export levels, but also the technology composition of exports, hinged critically on the quality
of the telecommunications system. In a world with globally integrated production systems, this
result is intuitively appealing.
18estimated percent variation in expected trade related to a one-standard deviation
variation in infrastructure and institutions around mean values. Values are nor-
malized (and so can be gauged as rough measures of the contribution to overall
sample variation in exports, measured by the coeﬃcient of variation.) In general,
the combination of institutional and infrastructure variation are much more impor-
tant to the pattern of bilateral trade volumes than is bilateral protection. In the
North-South sample split, for example, infrastructure variation implies marginal
variations in the volume of trade of roughly 11% around the mean for communi-
cations and 7% percent for transport, compared to 2% for tariﬀs. For the least
developed countries, transport is more important than communications linkages.
Overall, variations in infrastructure appear to explain far more variation in the
relative volumes of North-South trade than do variations in North tariﬀs on im-
ports from the South. For the LDC sample, tariﬀs are more important, though
even here the combined eﬀect of infrastructure and institutions implies 2.5 times
more variation in the sample than tariﬀs do. Turning ﬁnally to South-South trade,
tariﬀ eﬀects are again roughly the same as for the full sample split, while the role
of infrastructure is roughly comparable as well.
To explore further the diﬀerences following from sample splits in Tables 4-7, in
Table 8 we report a full sample regression that includes an interaction term for each
index (INF1,INF2,INS1,INS2) with respect to per-capita income. Associated
marginal eﬀects are shown in Figures 1 and 2. Given the combination of level
and interaction eﬀects, and variations in sign, it is hard to interpret the results
without some knowledge of the range of income linked to the coeﬃcient estimates.
For this reason, in Figures 1 and 2 we plot estimated marginal eﬀects (from the
level and interaction terms in Table 8) from the coeﬃcients reported in Table 8,
19linked to variations in institutions and infrastructure. Given the underlying model,
these marginal eﬀects can be interpreted as variations relative to the mean value
at a given income level. In other words, they quantify the observed improvement
in export performance when a country has better transport infrastructure, for
example, relative to other countries at the same income level.
From the ﬁgures, variations in basic transportation are much more important at
low income levels in explaining variations in trade performance than at higher
income levels. The opposite holds for communications, which grows increasingly
important, particularly as a country reaches the middle income range. We also
get a mixed message with institutions. While at high incomes a larger size of
government, with greater regulation, is bad for exports, this is much less so at
lower income levels. This is consistent with the North-LDC results from the split
sample regressions reported in Table 4.
As a check on the robustness of our results, we also report the regressions using
other institutional variables from alternative sources, based on full sample speciﬁ-
cation in Table 4. These measures are generally available for a shorter time span
than our primary indicators, leading to a truncation of our panel. Correspond-
ing results are shown in Table 9. Instead of using principal component analysis
we have included these institutional variables separately in the regressions. Since
these variables are also correlated with income of the country we follow the pre-
viously used methodology and regress the institutional variables on per-capita
income and population and take the residuals as representative of deviations from
income-conditional expected values for each of the four indexes.
Alternative variables measuring institutional quality were obtained from two sources.
20A proxy for the level of corruption was obtained from the Transparency Interna-
tional Corruption Perceptions Index for the period 1996-2003. The Index ranks
countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among
public oﬃcials and politicians and focuses on corruption in the public sector and
deﬁnes corruption as the abuse of public oﬃce for private gain.
Several other variables measuring the quality of institutions and governance were
taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). The authors estimate six
dimensions of governance covering 209 countries and territories for ﬁve time pe-
riods: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. Data for the year 1997, 1999, 2001 and
2003 were interpolated. The variables were used to check the robustness of our
previous results: government eﬀectiveness (measuring the competence of the bu-
reaucracy and the quality of public service delivery), political stability (measuring
the likelihood of violent threats to, or changes in, government, including terror-
ism), regulatory quality (measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly policies),
rule of law (measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence), voice and accountability
(measuring political, civil and human rights). The six indicators are measured in
units ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better
governance outcomes. The results using the variables measuring diﬀerent aspects
of institutional quality and the index proxying the importance of corruption in
the public sector conﬁrm the ﬁndings in the previous section. All the alternative
institutional variables have important positive impact on both the value of exports
and the probability of exporting.
214 Summary
Recent empirical evidence supports the characterization of developing countries
as belonging either to a cohort of countries that are deepening linkages with the
global trading system (globalizers), or to those that are not (Dollar and Kraay,
2004). The globalizers (like China and India) have seen rapid growth in trade, and
this growth has been linked to accelerating growth rates, pushing incomes on a
catch-up path with the OECD and driving poverty rates down in the process (Sala-
i-Martin, 2006). At the same time, there is another cohort of developing countries
(many in Africa) with a very diﬀerent story to tell. For a raft of reasons, they are
being left behind. While trade and growth may be wrapped up in a positive cycle
for some countries, those left behind have not experienced rapid trade growth, or
the related mechanisms that signal deeper integration into the global economy.
How important are tariﬀs, and how important are factors like infrastructure and
institutions in explaining the failure of non-performing developing countries to in-
tegrate into the trading system? To address this set of questions, we have explored
the evolution of trade across a panel spanning bilateral trade ﬂows from 1988 to
2002. We have examined not just trade volumes where trade is observed, but
also the determinants of zero trade ﬂows. This has involved estimating a selection
model with maximum likelihood techniques, where we examine the probability
of a given bilateral trade occurring and also the determinants of trade volumes.
We work with a gravity model in this context, where the standard right hand
side variables have been expanded to include indexes of both physical infrastruc-
ture and institutional development. Our results indicate that while the evidence
on institutions is somewhat mixed, at the same time, variation in infrastructure
22relative to the expected values for a given income cohort is strongly linked to
exports. Indeed, sample variation in basic infrastructure (communications and
transportation) explains substantially more of the overall sample variation in ex-
ports than do the trade barriers faced by developing countries. This points to a
more nuanced/diversiﬁed strategy, focused not just on WTO-related market access
conditions but trade facilitation (infrastructure and institutions) linked to trade
performance.
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27Table 1: Principal components weighting factors
component 1 component 2
Institutions
Size of government -0.189 0.710
Legal system property rights 0.673 -0.143
Sound money 0.325 0.372
Freedom to trade internationally 0.620 0.040
regulation 0.147 0.579










cumulative proportion 0.567 0.771
Source: own calculations.
28Table 2: Regression model variable description
lnp pcGDP log of per-capita GDP of partner
lnr pcGDP log of per-capita GDP of reporter
lnpPOP log of population of partner
lnrPOP log of population of reporter
lnT log of tariﬀ: (1+t)
lndist the log of distance (km, great circle method)
landlocked landlocked partner
comlang ethno shared linguistic/cultural heritage
colony reporter and partner had colonial relations
lnINF1 partner infrastructure index 1
lnINS1 partner institution index 1
lnINF2 partner infrastructure index 2
lnINS2 partner institution index 2
Table 3: OLS regressions: incomes and index values
Infrastructure 1 Infrastructure 2 Institution 1 Institution 2
lnGDP95percapita 1.198 0.293 0.648 0.187
(0.018)*** (0.008)*** (0.011)*** (0.013)***
lnPOP 0.079 0.516 0.039 -0.024
(0.016)*** (0.007)*** (0.011)*** (0.013)*
Constant -9.609 -7.001 -5.11 -0.85
(0.204)*** (0.092)*** (0.141)*** (0.174)***
R-squared 0.690 0.760 0.67 0.11



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Full N-S N-LDC S-S
sample sample sample sample
lnppcGDP 1.223 1.139 0.198 1.217
(0.004)*** (0.012)*** (0.073)*** (0.009)***
lnrpcGDP 3.335 0.959 0.651 3.368
(0.064)*** (0.141)*** (0.348)* (0.094)***
lnpPOP 1.179 1.147 1.337 1.184
(0.004)*** (0.009)*** (0.027)*** (0.007)***
lnrPOP 2.014 0.915 1.504 4.9
(0.142)*** (0.284)*** (0.694)** (0.235)***
lnDist -1.517 -1.404 -0.609 -1.815
(0.009)*** (0.018)*** (0.082)*** (0.013)***
Landlocked -0.302 -0.5 -0.666 -0.199
(0.021)*** (0.035)*** (0.062)*** (0.031)***
comlang ethno 0.723 0.606 0.923 0.715
(0.019)*** (0.035)*** (0.092)*** (0.029)***
colony 0.752 0.916 1.143 1.017
(0.055)*** (0.093)*** (0.214)*** (0.143)***
p INF1 0.18 0.157 0.127 0.176
(0.008)*** (0.013)*** (0.039)*** (0.012)***
p INS1 0.235 0.069 0.319 0.222
(0.010)*** (0.019)*** (0.052)*** (0.016)***
p INF2 0.163 0.371 0.176 0.242
(0.012)*** (0.021)*** (0.069)** (0.019)***
p INS2 0.179 0.237 -0.412 0.056
(0.008)*** (0.014)*** (0.058)*** (0.012)***
Tariffs -1.188 -1.353 -2.679 -1.317
(0.100)*** (0.240)*** (0.527)*** (0.130)***
Constant -56.495 -20.361 -25.755 -79.498
(2.028)*** (3.617)*** (5.013)*** (2.635)***
n-observations 138613 36578 8326 69245
R-squared 0.76 0.72 0.64 0.69
Source: own calculations. Standard errors in parentheses.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
31Table 6
Tobit estimates
Full N-S N-LDC S-S
sample sample sample sample
lnppcGDP 1.029 0.907 0.154 0.938
(0.003)*** (0.009)*** (0.043)*** (0.006)***
lnrpcGDP 0.451 0.346 -0.081 0.115
(0.044)*** (0.096)*** -0.17 (0.055)**
lnpPOP 0.939 0.951 0.943 0.905
(0.003)*** (0.007)*** (0.016)*** (0.005)***
lnrPOP 1.71 1.953 2.783 0.95
(0.104)*** (0.206)*** (0.359)*** (0.143)***
lnDist -1.209 -1.039 -0.45 -1.283
(0.007)*** (0.014)*** (0.047)*** (0.009)***
Landlocked -0.214 -0.345 -0.427 -0.174
(0.016)*** (0.027)*** (0.036)*** (0.020)***
comlang ethno 0.486 0.579 0.742 0.665
(0.015)*** (0.026)*** (0.052)*** (0.019)***
colony 0.468 0.468 1.048 -0.378
(0.044)*** (0.074)*** (0.136)*** (0.094)***
p INF1 0.151 0.079 0.055 0.131
(0.006)*** (0.010)*** (0.023)** (0.008)***
p INS1 0.212 0.052 0.135 0.255
(0.007)*** (0.014)*** (0.030)*** (0.011)***
p INF2 0.244 0.207 0.114 0.244
(0.010)*** (0.017)*** (0.042)*** (0.013)***
p INS2 0.202 0.249 -0.217 0.167
(0.006)*** (0.011)*** (0.033)*** (0.008)***
Tariffs 0.084 -0.178 -0.237 0.108
(-0.075) (-0.178) (-0.300) (-0.087)
Constant -17.24 -18.077 -17.201 -13.315
(0.592)*** (1.202)*** (2.144)*** (2.075)***
n-observations 209528 50266 13674 127697
Source: own calculations. Marginal eﬀects are presented in the table.
Standard errors in parentheses: *, **, *** signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, 1%
32Table 7: Contributions of variations in infrastructure and
institutions to overall variation in expected exports
full sample North-South North-LDC South-South
lnINF1 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.11
lnINF2 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.07
lnINS1 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.08
lnINS2 0.10 0.13 0.05 0.05
lnT 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.04
coeﬀ of variation for exports 1.30 1.15 2.88 3.14
note: calculated using estimated coeﬃcients and one standard deviation





trade, Probit trade, Probit
value Pr(trade) value Pr(trade)
lnp pcGDP 1.081*** 0.120*** 1.068*** 0.113***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
lnr pcGDP 2.610*** -0.032*** 2.619*** -0.032***
(0.051) (0.008) (0.051) (0.008)
lnp POP 1.030*** 0.102*** 1.025*** 0.099***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
lnr POP 1.367*** -0.353*** 1.294*** -0.339***
(0.114) (0.023) (0.115) (0.023)
lnDist -1.311*** -0.126*** -1.320*** -0.126***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002)
Landlocked -0.261*** -0.035*** -0.257*** -0.041***
(0.016) (0.003) (0.016) (0.004)
comlang ethno 0.622*** 0.034*** 0.605*** 0.037***
(0.016) (0.003) (0.016) (0.003)
colony 0.358*** -0.147*** 0.365*** -0.149***
(0.045) (0.018) (0.046) (0.018)
lnINF1 0.070* -0.033*** 0.176*** 0.040***
(0.030) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
lnINS1 0.194*** 0.017*** 0.226*** 0.102***
(0.008) (0.002) (0.041) (0.009)
lnINF2 1.165*** 0.199*** 0.181*** 0.055***
(0.048) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002)
lnINS2 0.165*** 0.034*** -0.090** 0.224***
(0.006) (0.001) (0.033) (0.007)
lnT -0.944*** -0.941***
(0.079) (0.079)
lnINF1 ∗ lngdppop 0.017*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.001)
lnINF2 ∗ lngdppop -0.111*** -0.017***
(0.005) (0.001)
lnINS1 ∗ lngdppop 0.032*** -0.024***
(0.004) (0.001)
lnINS2 ∗ lngdppop -0.003 -0.011***
(0.005) (0.001)
n-observations 209528 209528
LRtestofindep.eqns. χ2(1) =16.00 χ2(1)= 9.68
Prob> χ2=0.0000 Prob> χ2= 0.0019
Marginal eﬀects with std errors in parentheses.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Annex Table A.1: Sample countries
reporter & partner
Albania Guyana Nepal






Bulgaria Ireland Papua New Guinea




Botswana Jamaica Russian Federation
Central African Republic Jordan Rwanda
Chile Japan Senegal
Cote d’Ivoire Kenya Singapore
Cameroon Korea, Rep. El Salvador
Congo, Rep. Kuwait Slovak Republic
Colombia Sri Lanka Slovenia
Costa Rica Lithuania South Africa
Cyprus Latvia Sweden
Czech Republic Luxembourg Syrian Arab Republic
Germany Morocco Chad
Dominican Republic Madagascar Togo
Algeria Mexico Thailand
Ecuador Mali Trinidad and Tobago









Fiji Sierra Leone United Arab Emirates
Haiti
36Figure 1:
37Figure 2:
38